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European defense integration is encumbered by historic disagreement over two 
questions—what integration model should be used to develop a common defense and who 
should be included? The outcome the European Union’s earliest and foremost influential security 
arrangements of the 1940s and 1950s instigated a complex legacy of fault lines and friction. This 
paper looks at the history of the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty, the 1948 Brussels Treaty, and the failed 
1954 European Defense Community to illustrate the emergence of two sets of tensions, 
Atlanticism versus Europeanism and Supranationalism versus Intergovernmentalism. The 
tensions between these positions explain Europe’s inability to reach consensus and why defense 
integration is such a contested topic among European Union member states. Despite 
contemporary events that have the potential to galvanize increased harmony, the EU struggles 
to transcend the quixotic legacy of European defense integration.   
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At the 2017 European Security and Defense Conference in Prague, European Union 
President Jean-Claude Juncker announced that the protection of Europe can no longer be 
outsourced.1 This sentiment predates contemporary dialog as the EU has long struggled with its 
defense capacity after establishing a post-WWII security arrangement with the United States. 
Unsuccessful independent military operations in the 1990s won European defense the epithet of 
a “worm” by Belgium’s Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens.2  Since then, the EU has been 
preoccupied with transforming that worm into a credible, capable, and integrated force through 
the European Security and Defense Policy, an apparatus that unites EU members under a 
common policy with shared objectives. Yet, with twenty-eight separate and compartmentalized 
national defense markets, security and defense matters remain the most intergovernmental 
component of the EU, which is why the future of European defense integration lacks consensus.3 
European leaders have openly called for increasing European military capacity in order to ease 
dependence on their transatlantic guardian, but unanimity among members is contingent upon 
transcending historic tensions that are a part of a quixotic legacy left by the EU’s earliest defense 
treaties. This research seeks to demonstrate that the lack of consensus regarding European 
defense integration is due to two sets of tensions that emerged from the EU’s earliest defense 
treaties in the 1940s and 1950s. Using a historical-political narrative, section I will examine the 
                                               
1 Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Defense and Security Conference Prague: In Defense of Europe. 
(June 2017). ULR: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-1581_en.htm 
 
2 Whitney, Craig. “War in the Gulf: Europe; Gulf Sighting Shatters Europeans’ Fragile Unity.” The New York Times. 
(January 1991) URL: https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-fighting-shatters-
europeans-fragile-unity.html 
 




three treaties and argue firstly, that the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty linked Great Britain to the European 
continent and introduced the controversial Atlanticist position. Secondly, the 1948 Brussels 
Treaty would initiate the dichotomous relationship between Europe’s anxiety over US withdrawal 
and its own ambition to achieve strategic autonomy. Thirdly, the 1954 European Defense 
Community would set the inescapable precedent of preferred intergovernmentalism in matters 
of European defense. Section II will examine the two sets of tensions provoked by the treaties—
intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism and Atlanticism versus Europeanism. Section III 
will offer contemporary circumstances to conclude how the tensions left by these legacies 
forestall consensus and encumber defense integration today.  
  
Why Defense?  
In 1943, two anti-fascist prisoners of war conceptualized a post-war plan for a federal 
Europe that included a European armed service instead of national armies as an assurance 
against nationalism and war.4  Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi’s logic was that by transferring 
sovereign troops into a common military, Europe could create a de facto community where 
rivalry and war were no longer possible. European integration in the aftermath of World War II 
is often described as an effort to end the prolific conflicts that beset the continent, but Stephanie 
Anderson reasons that while European integration was fundamentally about security, security 
integration was not necessarily inevitable.5  It was not inevitable because of a dissonance 
                                               
4 Spinelli, Altiero and Enesto Rossi. Ventotene Manifesto, For a Free and United Europe. A Draft Manifesto. 1944. 
Section II. 
  





between the removal of nationalism to end war and the preservation of national identities deeply 
ingrained in European countries. Henry Kissinger argues that the discord deals mostly with 
histories. He states, “…while powers may appear to outsiders as factors in a security 
arrangement, they appear domestically as expressions of historical existence. No power will 
submit to a settlement, however well-balanced and however “secure”, which seems totally to 
deny its vision of itself.”6 Regarding this, the root of resistance is about national identity, and in 
preservation of such, also about sovereignty. The most imaginative effort to create a European 
army, the 1954 European Defense Community, provides an appropriate example since it was not 
mechanical problems but national pride and fear over lost sovereignty that caused it to fail. Its 
creator, Jean Monnet, admitted the idea of a European army was “at best premature”. 7  But even 
with seventy years of participation that has pushed EU members away from national tendencies 
towards integration, why does defense integration remain so contested?  
Ernest Haas sought to understand why EU members chose to integrate in some areas and 
not others. He theorized the process of European integration as an inevitable outcome of 
spillover, a motion of incremental participation in some areas that would lead to integration in 
others, much like a top-down invisible-hand pushing towards greater integration sector by 
sector.8 Haas’s observation of small steps evolving into larger goals is evident in the creation of 
                                               
6 Kissinger, A. Henry. A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration of Peace, 1812-1822 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), 146; Stephanie Anderson, Crafting EU Security Policy: In Pursuit of a European 
Identity (London: Lynne Reinner. 2008), 45.  
 
7 Schwartz, Thomas. The Transnational Partnership: Jean Monnet and Jack McCoy, in Monnet and the Americans, 
ed. Clifford Hackett (Washington, DC: Jean Monnet Council, 1995), 184-185.  
 
8 Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economical Forces, 1950-1957, (London: Stevens, 1958), 




many EU institutions, but if his notion of inevitability is correct, how is it that after circuitous 
growth and incremental collaboration, the EU is still unable to push towards a common defense? 
Incrementalism is often critiqued as too linear a process because European integration is a result 
of mixed impulses in which participation can be quickly abandoned or reversed when it no longer 
serves the interests of involved parties.9 Andrew Moravcsik interprets each critical phase in EU 
integration as intrinsically responsive to the decisions of national governments who bargain with 
each other on a case-by-case basis, not because they succumbed to a self-reinforcing process 
built upon fidelity to prior commitments.10 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the legacy of 
Europe’s defense and security cooperation. EU member states lack a unanimous vision for 
European security because they prefer to cooperate when necessary but jealously guard their 
sovereign authority to make decisions concerning their national troops. Because of this, the 
twenty-eight EU member states cannot agree on what integration model European defense 
integration should adopt and who should be involved in European security. Disagreement over 
these two questions derive from two sets of tensions—Intergovernmentalism versus 
Supranationalism and Atlanticism versus Europeanism. Before we examine the tensions, 
uncovering their evolution in these early treaties provides context and evidence of an inescapably 
complex legacy that can be found in the EU’s three earliest defense treaties in the aftermath of 
WWII.  
 
                                               
9 Nelsen, Brent F., and Alexander C-G. Stubb. The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of  
European Integration, (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1994), 241.  
 
10 Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Cornell 




SECTION I: The Treaties 
The Dunkirk Treaty 
The 1947 Dunkirk Treaty is often neglected in EU defense literature, yet it is significant 
because it sewed Great Britain to the European continent by giving it a say in European security 
matters. With Great Britain, so too came the Americans and ultimately, Atlanticism.  
In 1945, Great Britain had two choices. It could pursue a “third force” as a balance of 
power against both the United States and an emerging Soviet Union, or it could strengthen the 
alliance with the US in order to contain the perceived threat of the Soviet Union.11  Britain’s post-
war strategic position was jeopardized by debt and the inability to defend against new 
technological developments in military equipment. Thus, bankruptcy and a slipping grasp on its 
empire necessitated an appeal to the Americans. In 1946, Britain implored America to shoulder 
their financial and military burden of both Greece and Turkey on the grounds that if abandoned, 
they, the Mediterranean, and the Near East would be lost to communism.12 Along with most of 
Europe, Britain worried the US would revert to isolationist policies and leave Europe incapable of 
thwarting a conventional military attack should the USSR emerge as Europe’s next threat. If the 
US did withdraw, the need for close cooperation among west European states would be essential. 
Hedging against both possibilities, Britain kept a diplomatic line with the Americans but 
simultaneously introduced the idea of a west European security group.  
                                               
11 Baylis, John. “Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO.” The Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol.5. I.2 
(June 1982): p 247. 
 
12 Satterthwaite, Joseph. C. “The Truman Doctrine: Turkey.” The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social 
Science Vol. 401, No. 1. (1972): 75. 
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 France and Britain both had a stake in managing the dominant post-war question 
regarding what to do with a defeated Germany. Britain hesitated over excessive peace terms 
because it sought to avoid the hazard of alienating Germany into the arms of the Soviets. France, 
however, was unamenable to terms that did not end in subduing Germany. France’s dependence 
on foreign coal put its position on Franco-German reconciliation somewhere between serving its 
imperial interests and mitigating the fear of another German invasion. France was terrified by 
the possibility of renewed German aggression and eager to sustain access to its industrial Ruhr 
and Saar regions now under international control. British policymakers, however, were more 
anxious about Russia, uncertain about America, and at that particular moment, inclined to lead 
in organizing west Europe.13  Despite their imperial rivalry, in early 1944 the British Post Hostilities 
Planning Staff saw relations with France as critical in establishing any form of European 
cooperation that may help in buffering influence from the Soviets and the Americans. British 
Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin put forth the idea of a Western Security Group in the form of a 
defense pledge between these former competitors.  
Negotiations over the Anglo-French military pact began in 1946. Signatories we expected 
to collaborate “in measures of mutual assistance in the event of any renewal of German 
aggression…preventing Germany becoming again a menace to peace.”14 Britain regarded 
reference to the “German menace” as unconstructive rhetoric, especially since Britain sought to 
avoid conditions similar to the interwar period that had contributed to renewed Germany 
                                               
13 Reynold, D. Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century: London: Longham, 
1991. pp. 160-61 as quoted by Danilo Ardia in Twentieth-Century Anglo American Relations.  
 
14 “Treaty of Alliance and Mutual between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 




hostilities. Nevertheless, Britain would allow France the satisfaction in order to guarantee its 
signature because the treaty also served in convincing the Americans of European cooperation, 
a loose condition for their continued involvement in the region. The Americans were wary of 
Europe’s desire for peace and sought to avoid entanglements, thus the notion of European states 
collaborating promised a more appealing environment for American commitment. In 1946, US 
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes presented the Byrnes Treaty which offered Europe US 
assistance in preventing Germany from purchasing arms for the next twenty-five years. This 
treaty was seen as the first tangible sign that the Americans were willing to stay, and Britain was 
eager to secure it.  John Baylis accounts that because of this, Britain did not want the Dunkirk 
Treaty to appear too capable of achieving the same ends in fear that the US Senate would declare 
the Byrnes Treaty unnecessary.15  Yet, the Byrnes Treaty was strategically valuable because it 
sought to include the Soviets in international efforts to solve the German problem. To western 
Europe, the treaty would ensure American presence. To the Americans, it would serve as a tactic 
to see if the Soviets were willing to cooperate or had intentions of expanding into the whole of 
Germany.16 While the Byrnes Treaty is often seen as a backstage feature in the origins of the 
transatlantic relationship, it played a role in compelling Great Britain to push western Europe 
towards cooperation. 
In January 1947, US President Harry Truman appointed George Marshall as Secretary of 
State and the ideas of the Byrnes Treaty were eclipsed by support for German economic 
                                               
15 Baylis, “Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty,” 244-447 
 




rehabilitation as a “soft containment” strategy. Without the immediate prospect of US military 
assistance regarding Germany, on March 4th, 1947 the Dunkirk Treaty was signed. The Byrnes 
Treaty remained in negotiations because all parties were eager keep the Soviets involved. 
Meanwhile, Ernest Bevin leveraged the idea of expanding the Dunkirk Treaty to include more 
western states as continued evidence to sustain discussion with the Americans on securing 
military aid in Europe. In June 1947, Marshall announced the European Recovery Plan as an 
economic program to steady the political situation in Europe. The Marshall Plan was signed by 
Truman in April 1948 as an alternative to the Byrnes Treaty, the latter of which was eventually 
dropped for fear of antagonizing Germany into another pact with the Soviets.17  
Britain’s role in these negotiations explain how Atlanticism entered the dynamic of 
European security. Britain would not be fully accepted into the European continent until it joined 
the EU in 1973, but the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty stitched Britain to the fabric of Europe’s future 
through the backdoor via defense. This is significant because Britain was never seen as European. 
As early as 1923, one of the first conceptualizers of a federal Europe, Richard Coudenhove-
Kalergi, stated that what Europe would gain in territory and strength, they would lose in cohesion 
by embracing Great Britain.18 Due to their relations during WWII, Britain was “unofficially” 
charged with keeping the Americans involved in the continent to buffer against potential threats. 
Michael Fogarty argues Britain was perhaps reluctant to this role like Ajax being thrust onto the 
                                               
17 Pertinax, By. BYRNES ARMS PACT REPORTED DROPPED. New York Times (1923-Current file), Feb 21, 1948. 
http://stats.lib.pdx.edu/proxy.php?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/108310279?accountid=13265  
 
18 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard. “Pan-Europe” as quoted by Salmon, Trevor C., and William Nicoll. Building 




front lines.19 But Britain’s post-war ambitions speak more favorably to the notion that it saw itself 
as having a leading role in organizing West Europe. Prime Minister Winston Churchill made it 
abundantly clear in 1946 that while Britain supported the idea of a federation of European states 
of sort, he did not consider Britain to be one of them. That did not mean that Britain would forego 
the opportunity to influence Europe’s rehabilitation. Yet, security against Germany was not the 
primary fuel in Britain’s pursuit of a West European security arrangement. Head of Supply and 
Relief Department of the British Foreign office was recorded saying, “If we want to re-establish 
our position in Europe…the secret lies not in France, but in Western Germany.”20 On this the 
British and the Americans held concert. They both believed that Germany would be a better 
future ally than France, which is why Fogarty suggests that Great Britain had no long-term 
interest in a security arrangement but used the Dunkirk Treaty as a short-term solution to avoid 
a politically unstable France from falling to the communists.21 The treaty could also be 
interpreted as a British ploy to hem in its French imperial rival, yet it was clear that if the US was 
unwilling to remain in the region, Britain’s security would need to be strengthened by the 
creation of a European security group.22 It is also important to note ongoing subplot on behalf of 
Ernest Bevin who did see a larger picture of European solidarity and conducted negotiations 
under such auspices, although the outcomes were less than he hoped to see for Europe.   
                                               
19  Fogarty, Michael P. “Britain and Europe Since 1945.” The Review of Politics, Vol.19, No. 1 (Jan., 1957), 90-105. 
 
20  Greenwood, Sean. “Return to Dunkirk: The Origins of the Anglo-French treaty of March 1947.” The Journal of 
Strategic Studies. Vol.6, No. 4. (December, 1983), 52. 
 
21 See note Footnote 19.  
 
22  Greenwood, Sean. “Ernest Bevin, France and ‘Western Union’: August 1945-Frebruary 1946.” European History 




By accepting the Marshall offer in 1947, Britain became a champion of strengthening its 
alliance with the US, a factor that pulled it away from the original notion that its own security 
was wrapped up in the main continent.23 Some argue that the Marshall Plan doomed European 
security integration from the very beginning since it removed the degree of urgency that usually 
drives reticent parties to collaborate. The Marshall Plan’s economic assistance allowed Britain 
and France to direct greater attention on managing their crumbling empires rather than 
emphasizing cooperation. France would even use some of its Marshall funds to fight its colonial 
war in Indo-China. Nevertheless, Danilo Ardina argues the Dunkirk Treaty is significant because 
in a phase of post-war uncertainty, the final frame of the European system was initiated.24 
Drawing a straight line from the Dunkirk Treaty to the European Coal and Steel Community is 
perhaps too linear, although it is worth noting that the Dunkirk Treaty did include language of 
cultural and economic cooperation. More simply, Ardina is arguing that the Anglo-French pact 
was concrete proof Europe had decided to pursue a future of cooperation and Great Britain 
would undeniably be a part of it. Ultimately, the Anglo-American relationship would initiate the 





                                               
23 Zeeman, Bert. “Britain and the Cold War: An Alternative Approach. The Treaty of Dunkirk Example.” European 
History Quarterly. Vol. 16. (1986), 353. 
 
24 Hollowell, Jonathan. “Twentieth century Anglo-American relations”, 72.  
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The Brussels Treaty 
History of the 1948 Brussels Treaty is largely overshadowed by the North Atlantic Pact that 
followed hard on its heels in 1949. While the North Atlantic Pact profoundly altered European 
security, the Brussels Treaty explains the origins of the dichotomous and seemingly irreparable 
dynamic between Europe’s long-standing anxiety over US withdrawal and its own ambition to 
achieve strategic autonomy. It also explains the origins of the Europeanist position. 
Expanding the Dunkirk Treaty was delicate because those involved wanted to avoid 
western European cooperation appearing as premature rallying against Russia. The Soviets had 
established political and economic influence over an east European bloc and Ernest Bevin sought 
to use the Brussels Treaty as a basis to establish a Western Union that would unite willing parties 
under common values, goals, and security. Disagreement over what this proposed Western 
Union would actually look like and who should be involved hampered negotiations. Not 
surprisingly, France insisted the new pact maintain the Dunkirk model of suppressing Germany; 
France sought to eventually establish a protectorate over German’s industrial Saar region and 
acquire extensive rights over the railways.25 The US considered Europe’s preoccupation with 
security against Germany to be outmoded and impractical considering Soviet aggression seemed 
more threatening. Despite the pragmatic diplomacy Secretary Marshall extended towards 
Moscow, it was becoming increasingly evident that preventing soviet expansion would be 
necessary. As early as December 1947, Ernest Bevin, French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, 
and George Marshall met to deliberate on a federation that included the Americans, a “western 
                                               




democratic system that would not be a formal alliance, but an understanding backed by power, 
money and resolute action…” in order to save Western civilization from soviet aggression.26 The 
idea was a step towards a robust transatlantic relationship, but the US was more inclined to 
support European cooperation than participate in a regional defense scheme. Nevertheless, the 
US did engage in talks regarding a possible transatlantic security arrangement which would 
include Canada and if it were ever signed, members of this proposed Brussels Treaty. Major 
disagreement over who would be involved in this Western Union were causing negotiating 
parties to forestall progress on signing the Brussels Treaty. The reality is that states were hedging, 
waiting for the Soviets to show their cards and in February 1948, they did just that.  
Czechoslovakia straddled a precarious geopolitical position in 1948. It had strong ties with 
the Soviet Union, friendly relations with Western powers, and sought to act as a bridge between 
the East and West, communism and democracy.27 With Soviet backing, on February 21st the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia carried out a coup on the Czech government and obtained 
dominant control. This event confirmed that the USSR was a threat to internal European politics 
and would similarly attempt to destabilize politics in Italy and France next.  This galvanized those 
negotiating over the Brussels Treaty to finally overcome their different positions. The Brussels 
Treaty was signed one month later on March 1948 adding Belgium, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands to the defense pledge. And so, the Brussels Treaty established the Western Union 
                                               
26 Insall, Tony and P. Salomon. “The Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties, 1947-1949.” Documents on British Policy 
Overseas. Series I, Vol. 10, (2015), ix-x. 
 
27 Svik, Peter. “The Czechoslovak Factor in Western Alliance Building, 1945-1948.” Journal of Cold War 
Studies.Vol.18, No.1 (Winter 2016), 137.  
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defense pledge that would undergo many permutations over the decades before eventually 
becoming the EU’s current European Security and Defense Policy.  
The coup also galvanized the Americans. After convincing Truman that US participation in 
European security would indicate support to stop the expansion of communist dictatorship 
and “stiffen moral in the free countries of Europe”, Secretary Marshall informed the British 
ambassador the US was now “prepared to proceed at once with joint discussions on the 
establishment of an Atlantic security system.” 28  The North Atlantic Treaty would be signed April 
1949 thereby granting Europe the security they sought from US participation. However, it was 
not infinite, which explains why the Brussels Treaty was not dissolved in light of the protection 
provided by the Americans.  
Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty declared that an armed attack against any of the 
signed parties shall be considered an attack against them all. Even with this assurance, Europe 
continue to keep the six-member Western Union security apparatus as a bulwark against the 
possibility of US withdrawal. The Brussels Treaty bound signatories for fifty years while the North 
Atlantic Treaty was binding for ten years after which it could be reviewed; after twenty years a 
signatory could leave.29 The Brussels Treaty’s more peremptory language made the North 
Atlantic Treaty’s ambiguous use of “action as it deems necessary” only somewhat reassuring.30 
The Brussels Pact obligated that if any contracting parties be the object of an attack, the other 
                                               
28 Svik, “The Czechoslovak Factor in Western Alliance Building,” 154-156 
 
29 Brussels Treaty, Brussels, Belgium 1948, Article X; North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. 4 April 1949, Article XII 
 
30  Warren, Lansing. “West Union Speeds Arms Integration: Britain, France, Benelux Meet to Merge Defense Plans 




parties will afford all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.31 Yet, the protection 
offered by the North Atlantic Treaty reduced the degree of urgency Europe initially felt by 
creating a Western Union security group. The North Atlantic Pact is important because it 
inextricably linked Europe to the United States and similar to claims about the Marshall Plan, Seth 
Jones argues that because of the exponential growth of US presence in the region, European 
defense cooperation became extraneous; US troops in western Europe increased from 79,495 in 
1950 to 356,787 in 1955. Jones’s argument demonstrates that security cooperation through the 
EU has been inversely correlated with American power in Europe, “the lower the American 
military presence and commitment to the continent, the greater the incentive for cooperation.32 
In the long-term, the North Atlantic Treaty removed the realistic motivations Europe would have 
in establishing a common defense. The Western Union became more of a symbol of Europeanism 
to counteract the growing US influence over security and defense matters. The two security 
networks would coexist because of Europe’s fundamental anxiety over US withdrawal but also 
because of Europe’s desire to reclaim that idea of a Europe as a “third force”. This would 
ultimately create a seemingly irreparable dynamic between the desire to be independent of US 





                                               
31 Brussels Treaty, Article III. 
 
32   Jones, Seth G. “The European Union and the Security Dilemma.” Securities Studies. Vol. 12. No. 3, (2010), 119. 
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European Defense Community  
The Dunkirk and Brussels Treaty were more conventional regarding defense pledges, but 
in 1950 Europe was very close to fulfilling Spinelli and Rossi’s vision of a single European armed 
service. The European Defense Community is an example of the possibilities and limitations of 
European defense integration and is important in the narrative because it set the precedent of 
preferred intergovernmentalism thereafter.   
In April 1949, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Ernest Bevin and French Foreign 
Minister Robert Schuman met to discuss the Occupation Statue of West Germany which intended 
to solve matters regarding West Germany’s sovereignty along with establishing its access to 
Marshall Plan funds. West Germany had now become a pawn in the larger East-West rivalry and 
the Americans were willing to advance German rehabilitation efforts without France. The French 
were eager to preserve authority over German coal and steel sources and knowing US 
policymakers would support a solid step towards European unity that included West Germany, 
Jean Monnet concocted the European Coal and Steel Community to serve both interests. If 
Europe was to avoid another continental war, some form of Franco-German reconciliation was 
necessary. Jean Monnet wrote, “if only the French could lose their fear of German industrial 
domination, then the greatest obstacle to a united Europe would be removed.”33 He believed 
pooling the coal and steel industries formally used to produce the weapons of war would create 
a guarantee of peace. Robert Schuman would champion this plan before the French National 
                                               




Assembly declaring that the joining of industries would make war “not merely unthinkable, but 
materially impossible.”34   
Five days after negotiations for the Schuman Plan began, 90,000 North Korean troops 
crossed the 38th parallel and invaded their southern counterpart. US troops stationed in South 
Korea returned fire leading Truman to declared war the following day June 25th, 1950. The US 
and Europe suspected the invasion was instigated by the USSR and believed a Soviet attack on 
Europe was imminent. With the US now involved in Korea, Europeans were concerned the US 
would not be able counter a threat in the European theater as well.35 To assuage such fears, the 
US agreed to send additional combat divisions to Europe, establish a unified command structure 
led by an American Supreme Allied Commander, and to create the unified defense force that 
NATO is today. In exchange, the US wanted to include German units and asked France to support 
German rearmament in the name of defense against the Soviets.36 This instantly jeopardized the 
Schuman Plan. France knew that if allowed to rearm, Germany would have little interest or need 
to join the coal and steel community.37 As with the Dunkirk and Brussels treaties, an armed 
Germany was an intolerable outcome for the French. In an effort to mitigate this possibility, 
                                               
34 The Schuman Declaration-May 9, 1950. URL: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-
day/schuman-declaration_en 
 
35 Wells, “Jean Monnet,” 139.  
 
36 Wells, Samuel F. Jr., “The Korean War: Miscalculation and Alliance Transformation,” in The Routledge Handbook 
of Transatlantic Security. Ed. Basil Germond, Jussi M.Hanhimaki, and Georges-Henri Soutou (London: Routledge, 
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French Prime Minister René Pleven offered western Europe a plan to distract the Americans and 
avoid the failure of the Schuman Plan.  
The Pleven Plan offered to resuscitate the Western Union created by the Brussels Treaty 
and mold it into a unified supranational European defense force, a fusion of human and material 
components under a single authority and budget. To the French National Assembly, he implored 
a seal of commitment to the coal and steel plan after which the French government would find a 
solution to German military contribution more agreeable to the type of future Europeans 
envisioned. Thus, to avoid German rearmament as sought by the Americans, Pleven proposed:  
…the creation, for the purposes of common defense, of a European army tied to the 
political institutions of a united Europe…a European army cannot be created simply 
placing military units side by side, since in practice, this would merely mask a coalition of 
the old sort. Tasks that can be tackled only in common must be matched by common 
institutions.38  
 
Apart from the appeal to establish more common institutions, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
representative Alexandre Parodi saw the plan merely as “a measure to gain time and avoid the 
enormous risks of rearmament in Germany.” 39  Fear that an armed Germany may come back to 
haunt Europe facilitated unexpected support for the in the Pleven’s European Defense 
Community (EDC).  
It is astonishing the EDC gained momentum because not only was Europe recently at 
peace, but European governments did not even agree over nourishing unity beyond avoiding 
                                               
38 Journal officiel de la République française. Débats Parlementaires. Assemblée nationale. 10.1950. Paris: 
Imprimerie nationale. "Déclaration du Gouverneur français René Pleven le 24 Octobre 1950", p. 7118- 7119 as 
quoted by Maxime Lavire in Debating European Security and Defense Policy: Understanding the Complexities 
(London: New York: Ruotledge: 2014), 60-61.  
 
39  Gavin, Victor. (2010). “Were the interests really parallel? The United States, Western Europe and the Early 




renewed conflict between one another. The prevailing narrative of post-war Europe is that from 
the ashes of a war-torn continent, a moral consensus to break with the past and create a new 
European federation emerged.40 The bitter lessons of war did generate the moral discourse for a 
peace-driven Europe, but nationalism and state sovereignty were not so readily abandoned after 
WWII. As aforementioned, both France and Britain sought to maintain and even resuscitate what 
was left of their empires. Governments in exile returned with strong perspectives of restoring 
national pride, and parliaments resurfaced despite their inefficacy contributing to the rise of 
nationalism in the interwar period. The idea of a Pan-Europa or a European federation even 
predates the end of WWII. French Foreign minister, Aristide Briand, submitted a plan for a 
European Union in the 1930 after a successful moment in Franco-German reconciliation known 
as the Locarno period. Briand’s memorandum saw a European federation “built not upon the 
idea of unity but of union” which it to say European cooperation was desired but not at the cost 
of sovereignty.41 In form, the earliest idea of a European Union was grounded in a more 
intergovernmental framework, such as voluntary cooperation among states, not the creation of 
a super-state. In the late 30s and early 40s, Nazi-Fascists would co-opt the notion of a “Greater 
Europe” into the elimination of the particularism that came with nations because they saw the 
state-system as antithetical to a new order.42 Therefore, the resurgence of the nation-state 
system after WWII could be examined as a reaction to the sort of independence, identity, and 
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self-determination that was threatened under the Fascists. European states had undergone a 
violent disregard for the clear demarcations of state power which made abdicating it to a single 
bureaucratic authority less appealing. Also present is a deep misgiving towards the 
experimenting of elite politicians and technocrats who, as best described by Otto von Bismarck, 
use the word “Europe” to demand from “other powers what they in their own name dare not 
request.”43 This sentiment would underwrite much of the European Union’s struggle to unify in 
matters of defense.  
Even though the European Coal and Steel Community passed in 1951, the EDC stayed in 
negotiations until 1954. While it may have begun as a convenient tactic to prevent America from 
rearming Germany, to Jean Monnet, creating a supranational structure was a part of the “ever 
closer union” he sought for Europe. Institutional governance was a trending intellectual exercise 
of elite politicians and bureaucrats in these moments—the Schuman Plan also had a “High 
Authority” that surpassed the authority of the state and in 1952, the European Political 
Community aimed at establishing supranational political unity also failed. Monnet believed in 
technocratic bodies running politics, especially since the politics of the masses were blamed for 
causing nationalist trouble. More so, there was an emerging ethos among the Christian Democrat 
party who were interested in governing in a way where political legitimacy would derive from 
the people but not be exercised by the people.44 This would contribute to the concept of a 
‘democratic deficit’ present in EU institutions and a strong reason why maintaining national 
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armies symbolically acts as preservation of sovereignty. In Monnet’s efforts to engineer solidarity 
through these institutions he underestimated the influence of legislative bodies. National pride 
and state sovereignty ultimately destroyed the idea of the EDC, and most ironically in the very 
government that proposed the plan. By 1954, France was forced to surrender 11,000 troops near 
Dien Bien Phu in an embarrassing defeat in Indo-China that bruised French national pride 
resulting in a surge of French nationalism. With the combined effort of the French Communist 
Party and General de Gaulle’s Rally of the French People Party, the EDC was rejected by the 
French National Assembly because they saw it as far too supranational a project that would 
undermine French autonomy and military might. The European Defense Community left Europe’s 
purview four months later on August 30th, 1954.  
Quickly following the failure of the EDC, conferences in both London and Paris were 
conducted to finally solve the issue of German rearmament.  To the Americans and the British, 
West Germany joining NATO was the best alternative to the EDC and so in 1955, West Germany 
was admitted to NATO. Five days later the Warsaw Pact was signed and so began the bipolar 
order that loomed until the late 1990s. The Paris Agreement furthermore reaffirmed the 
collective-defense union created under the Dunkirk and Brussels treaties by changing the group 
from the Western Union to Western European Union (WEU). Yet, it would remain relatively 
dormant within NATO until the Council of Western European Union and the Maastricht Treaty 
both in 1992. Despite initial efforts to unite in matters of defense, the legacy of the EDC set the 
stage of a preferred intergovernmental model in such that European states would reject 




SECTION II: The Tensions 
 
Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism 
Influenced by the outcome of the EDC, the first prevailing tension that impedes consensus 
is disagreement over what defense integration model the EU should adopt. The “European 
project” balances two integration models: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. 
Intergovernmentalism is an approach to governing that privileges the role of the state in 
European cooperation. It is rooted in the realist tradition in which states are the key actors and 
the political relations between states are channeled primarily through national governments.45 
Cooperation is voluntary, and decisions are made on a case-by-case basis by gathered heads of 
state and governments who bargain and compromise in order to reach consensus on mutual 
matters. States are held to their collective commitments but opting out is commonly allowed. 
Intergovernmentalism holds security and defense to be a fundamental component of state 
sovereignty and to abdicate authority over national troops would be surrendering independence 
as a state. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) currently operates under an 
intergovernmental model. From 1995 through 2012 the EU established and used the European 
Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR) composed of 60,000 troops from four EU states. Due to 
inefficient outcomes and lack of coordination, EUROFOR was dissolved in 2012 for a more 
itinerate structure of EU Battlegroups. EU Battlegroups consist of 1,500 troops provided by 12-
member states that are deployable within 15 days for standalone missions or for the initial phase 
of larger operations. These Battlegroups operate under a voluntary rotating scheme, called 
                                               




rosterization, where every six months a new pair of Battlegroups is placed on standby to replace 
the outgoing Battlegroup. Yf Reykers argues this system provides three challenges. First, getting 
members to commit troops is difficult because they are already limited in their defense capacity. 
Second, how the Battlegroup will be composed depends on the particular nation in rotation and 
what type of resources they have available, i.e., land, naval, air, or even niche capabilities. This 
limits their autonomy because the Battlegroups on standby have to determine how they will carry 
on the mission but with different resources and outsourcing to NATO is common. Thirdly, Reykers 
argues that putting one’s troops on the roster is a political commitment but it does not guarantee 
they agree to be deployed when the time comes, that is, they can refuse to do so.46 Despite its 
complicated architecture and the financial and political asymmetry, Moravcsik argues that it is 
both imposing and technically acts as a united defense force in certain capacities regarding 
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.47 Yet even with these small battlegroups, the 
intergovernmental model makes European defense capabilities incomplete in the conventional 
sense and fraught with disparateness. EU member states do not regularly agree over when, 
where, and under what conditions they should participate in collectively managing crises. The 
2003 row over the Iraq invasion exposed that unanimous decisions on foreign policy were not an 
easy task in crucial times. In fact, disagreement over the Iraq invasion caused additional internal 
fault lines to emerge over diverging philosophies regarding intervention and non-intervention. 
Intergovernmentalism is sufficient in supporting the particularisms of statehoods, but in terms 
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of the European project, it is critiqued as reinforcing the notions of “self-interest” over greater 
cooperation. 
Security cooperation is not a novel concept, the Dunkirk and Brussel’s treaties say as 
much, but integration takes cooperation much further in that the intention is to become 
automatic and irrevocable.48 Supranationalism challenges the frontiers of dominant state power 
and sees a united defense force, a single arsenal and policy, as an inevitable step in the European 
integration process. In order for Europe to become a global actor, members must pool military 
resources and act as one homogeneous body under the leadership of EU institutions, not the 
states. Supranationalism is seen as transcending outdated modes of state realism in the name of 
efficiency and progress for collective ends. Theoretically, this would look more like a traditional 
army such as the one proposed by the European Defense Community. Such a model seeks to give 
Europe the institutional capacity to speak with one cohesive voice, but it is a radical departure 
from the state-system and requires EU member states to sacrifice something they are historically 
hesitant to forgo.  
The models are as mechanical as they are theoretical. Intergovernmentalism is more 
grounded in the tenants of the 1648 Westphalian tradition which established the modern state 
system of exclusive state sovereignty. Supranationalism is more aligned with functionalism, 
where groups or institutions come together to solve problems, the end goal being the 
obsolescence of the state-system. Europe has had remarkable success in establishing epistemic 
networks that handle European security through horizontal integration of niche abilities and 
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apparatuses, but when it comes to defense, some European states are readier to integrate than 
others. The root of the disagreement is the degree of compromise between strengthening the 
efficacy of EU institutions and maintaining sovereignty. That the EDC was both proposed and 
rejected by France is an especially interesting example of the parallelism of the scenario where 
creative contributions to new governing models war with concessions that appear to jeopardize 
certain ideas of survival. Interestingly, Great Britain and France would at times have overlapping, 
albeit nuanced, outlooks on intergovernmentalism and defense, but they would never reach 
consensus on the long-term vision of who should be involved in the process.  
 
Atlanticism and Europeanism 
The second prevailing tension is about who should be involved in European security. This 
is ultimately about the United States and a contest between conflicting geopolitical ideologies. 
The two original signers of the Dunkirk Treaty would ultimately part ways on this regard, each 
vigorously representing different camps over the future of Europe’s security. Great Britain would 
be a champion of the controversial Atlanticism, and France would ceaselessly promote the 
idealistic Europeanism.  
Atlanticism is the belief that the transatlantic partnership between the United States and 
Europe is a special relationship where close economic, political, and defense cooperation allows 
them to mutually prosper. Atlanticists are committed advocates of defense coordination with the 
US and seek to reinforce European military cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). They see an independent European military as a challenge to that 
relationship and an unnecessary duplication of resources, especially since most EU members 
already belong to NATO. In the aftermath of the Dunkirk Treaty and after a few precarious 
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moments in the 1960s, Great Britain would become the biggest supporter of the transatlantic 
relationship, in part due to its instrumental role in securing American involvement after WWII. 
The Anglo-American relationship created resentment among European states who already 
struggled with the British involvement in the European project. However, US involvement in 
European security emerged as a multifaceted dilemma, because the structure of the transatlantic 
partnership is almost irrevocably necessary for European safety from a practical lens, but such a 
reality challenges the European identity.  
Europeanists believe that as long as the US is on hand to ensure European security and 
with it, US influence, there will be a clear limit to the ambition of the European project.49 As the 
history above demonstrates, US participation was necessary for protection in the post-war 
context, but France became skeptical of American influence. Charles de Gaulle would play an 
instrumental role in shaping France’s position on European defense because he believed a 
colossal transatlantic relationship under American dependence and leadership would 
“completely swallow up the European Community.”50 Europeanists see European cooperation as 
strictly European and a single European defense can act as a way to achieve strategic autonomy 
in a larger ambition of becoming a global actor beyond economic leadership.51 This is not a new 
ambition, it derives from the notion that Europe could become a “third force” to counterbalance 
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the bipolarity of the Americans and the Soviets in which Europe aspired to offer an alternative 
option. Unable to balance against the US in the post-WWII climate and in order to guarantee 
security against the soviets, a transatlantic relationship was the most viable option for Europe. 
Because of this, the American security umbrella allowed “peace to reign in Western Europe” 
which contributed to Europe experimenting in new political and economic initiatives.52 The first 
half of the twentieth-century cast a dark shroud on Europe, and the architectures of the 
European project sought Europe’s restoration by virtue of its illustrious past to thereafter project 
a devotion to liberalism and peace.53 This refurbished imaged and the new initiatives allowed 
Europe to develop remarkable economic status and abundant soft power appeal. And while 
Europe has done well exporting that image, Europeanists also see their soft power as not enough 
if they are to compete with other superpowers; they wish to see themselves as a civilian power 
with teeth.54  
Europeanism however, depends upon engineering a consciousness of shared political 
destiny and a common future. Why Europeanism and Atlanticism war with one another is that 
an aid in establishing solidarity among the many diverse European nations was then and remains 
today the collective recognition that they are not American. America plays the role of the 
constitutive “other” in order for Europeans to agree on a shared identity consistent with the goals 
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of the European Union. John McCormick categorizes many of the manifest qualities and 
philosophical differences: Europe exemplifies a more collective society whereas America retains 
a penchant for individualism; to America’s traditionalism, Europe is secular and post 
materialistic.55 One important distinction pertaining to this research however, is that while 
America amassed hard power capacity after WWII, Europe developed the image of having a low 
threshold for the use of force. 56 This makes its desire for increased military power somewhat 
perplexing because the EU already has the capacity to handle peacekeeping and humanitarian 
situations. It is rational that the EU would seek to expand its power, but the puzzle is why it 
desires conventional military capacity when it portrays itself as a new breed of an international 
actor, an actor that transcends the traditional power dynamics of dominant hard power capacity 
in a world where violence in statecraft is increasingly rejected.57 Why the EU wants a military 
despite its success as a soft-power and the reality of an international system in which conflicts 
are increasingly resolved multilaterally, is one side of the same coin that keeps Europe from 
having one. Creating a European army can be interpreted as an effort to reclaim the European 
ambition and solidify European identity that has been stymied by the legacy of these early 
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SECTION: III Contemporary Relevance 
 
 
Using the history of the early defense treaties, I have outlined three outcomes from 
whence the lack of consensus emerged. Firstly, the Dunkirk Treaty sewed Great Britain to the 
European continent by giving it a say in European security matters and ultimately introduced 
Atlanticism. Second, the Brussels Treaty initiated the dichotomous and seemingly irreparable 
relationship between Europe’s long-standing anxiety over US withdrawal and its own ambition 
to achieve strategic autonomy. Thirdly, the European Defense Community set the precedent of 
preferred intergovernmentalism when it comes to defense integration. Taken holistically, all 
three intermingle to create the quagmire of European defense integration today. This concluding 
section will look at three contemporary circumstances jointly in order to amplify the conflicting 
tensions created by these early treaties.  
 
United Kingdom Referendum 
In June 2016, the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union. The event 
sparked conjecture over whether its absence would finally galvanize European military 
integration. In September, the European Council issued the Bratislava Road Map for stronger 
defense capacity, and in November, the European Parliament voted in robust favor of a European 
Defense Union. One year later in June 2017, the European Commission launched the European 
Defense Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defense (PESCO) was 
signed November 2017 by twenty-five EU members.58 Signatories committed to progress defense 
                                               




integration in which they would “join forces…spend together, invest together, buy together, and 
act together.”59 The United Kingdom was excluded from all these motions. The subsequent 
timing of these events is not coincidental. Great Britain was seen as an impediment to achieving 
European cohesion because of its position on strengthening relations with NATO rather than 
establishing European strategic autonomy. With the UK’s absence, the EU can ostensibly reclaim 
that seventy-year-long ambition of a European “third force” free from the influence of the 
transatlantic relationship. Yet, like many of its predecessors, these motions run the risk of being 
more symbolic than transformative until put into action or whether or not they are done in joint 
coordination or competition with NATO. Yet, rather than seeing “Brexit” as a grand liberation 
from the Anglo-American relationship that withheld Europeanism from fulfilling its potential, 
perhaps this momentary rise in EU defense cooperation can be interpreted as Europe worrying 
that the UK’s absence is a precursor to US withdrawal. 
 
“America First”, Fear of US Withdrawal and the Self-fulfilling Prophecy 
 In 2017 German Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed, “Let’s not fool ourselves. From 
the point of view of some of our traditional partners—and I am thinking here about the 
transatlantic relations—there is no eternal guarantee of close cooperation with us 
Europeans…”60 Chancellor Merkel may have intended this as a verbal sally at a new US 
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administration, but she speaks truth to the notion that Europe was never fooled by an eternal 
guarantee of cooperation with the US. Maintaining the Western Union despite the North Atlantic 
Pact showed as much back then and despite Europe’s desire to establish strategic autonomy, 
abandonment fears have always been present in transatlantic relations.61 As aforementioned, 
immediately following WWII Europe worried US isolationism would leave them to manage the 
threats of its neighbors alone. This anxiety occurred again after the Cold War when Europe was 
no longer a central focus of American foreign policy, which explains the EU’s deliberate steps 
towards defense integration in the 1990s in an attempt to mitigate security troubles in its own 
backyard. Incoordination and insufficient resources exposed the shortcomings of European 
defense capacity and in 1999, the EU established the more comprehensive European Security 
and Defense Policy. But seventy years of relying on NATO created an “expectation-capacity gap” 
that puts Europe in the inconvenient position of balancing against what it wants and what it 
cannot practically achieve, which is why contemporary discourse is exposes the impossible 
dilemma of being of fear over US withdrawal and the lack willingness on behalf of the EU 
members to invest in defense. 
Despite lip service given to sustaining interoperability with NATO, it is no mystery that 
European leaders carry doubt over US commitment to the transatlantic partnership after 
discursive positioning by US President Donald Trump who called NATO obsolete in 2016.62 In 
2017, European Council President Donald Tusk wrote an open letter to the twenty-seven EU 
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member leaders to express inter alia concerns over the highly unpredictable declarations of the 
new American administration that is “seeming to put into question the last 70 years of American 
foreign policy.” The EU has historically been critical of US foreign policy, which is why this is more 
likely a platform to proclaim a divergence in EU-US values as an aid in combating the existential 
crisis the EU is experiencing. In that same letter Tusk outlines three major threats Europe faces: 
an assertive China, an aggressive Russia, and terror and anarchy in the Middle East.63 Currently, 
these threats do not require military response, and if they did, the EU could not mitigate them in 
the foreseeable future without US assistance. Even as rhetoric, the posturing does have the 
potential to be a self-fulfilling prophecy for Europe. If the EU pursues an exclusive Europeanist 
approach to its own security, the US may indeed feel compelled to withdraw especially at a time 
where isolationist discourse is gaining agency under the US Trump Administration. The US could 
own up to its own rhetorical grievance of carrying NATO’s financial burden and justify a 
withdrawal under an “America first” policy. This is an improbable outcome, but if it did happen, 
Europe be left to handle its list of threats alone. This would be challenging for EU leaders because 
while the European public do occasionally regard the United States a threat to world stability, it 
paradoxically views Europe’s protection as an American job.64 A median of 68 percent of NATO 
member countries surveyed believe that the US would uphold its commitment, more so than 
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they themselves would be willing to do.65 More importantly, Eurobarometer reports in 2017 that 
of EU member states, 39% are “somewhat in favor” and only 16% are “totally in favor” of the 
creation of an EU army.66    The lack of public support in this department is significant because EU 
governments are generally unwilling to invest in their own defenses, much less in the equipment 
it would take for the EU to achieve strategic autonomy from NATO.  
Independent military capacity would take significant spending that most EU governments 
are unwilling, and to a certain extent unable to afford. Few European states strictly comply, but 
NATO members are already obligated to commit 2% of their GDP to the organization. States 
barely contribute to NATO, if decision-makers spend the money it would take to compete or 
replace NATO, they risk losing public support for themselves and the European project.  Acquiring 
heavy lift capabilities to compete with NATO’s resources would overstep compliance with this 
debt and fiscal responsibility that EU institutions expect of EU member states. The Growth and 
Stability Pact (GSP) stipulates that EU member states are to stay within the 3% of government 
deficit and national debt cannot accede 60% of GDP; increased defense spending would accede 
such limits. In a clever maneuver, under the 2016 European Defense Action Plan, national capital 
contributions to the European Defense Fund will be discounted from the expectations of the 
Growth and Stability Pact.67 Individual military spending will still be held within the restrictions 
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of the GSP. All the same, the resounding critique in contributing to European defense capacity is 
that it is creates unnecessary duplication of resources that already exist within NATO.  To the 
expectation-capacity gap, Stephanie Anderson argues that Europe’s pursuit to build EU military 
capacity represents a desire, as opposed to a necessity; it is not about defense per say, but about 
solidifying European identity in the nation-building process, including its desire to play a larger 
global role.68 In semblance to this, the lack of consensus regarding defense integration can be 
seen both as a crisis of capacity and a crisis of confidence. Not surprisingly, the political 
ramifications sustain the dilemma. This discussion bleeds inextricably into the discord between 
the institutional models and their response to the ostensible rise of nationalist politics within the 
European Union.  
 
Rise in Nationalism 
Donald Tusk’s open letter was also provoked by renewed nationalistic discourse as a 
response to the public dissatisfaction with EU institutions. He sought to warn European leaders 
that,   
…it must be made crystal clear that the disintegration of the European Union will not lead 
to the restoration of some mythical, full sovereignty of its member states, but to their real 
and factual dependence on the great superpowers…only together can we be fully 
independent. 69  
 
The inescapable conflict is that the independence Tusk seeks is the same type of independence 
EU member states invoke to maintain autonomy from advanced EU integration. Tusk is speaking 
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to the EU’s existential crisis that is exacerbated by member states resisting to transfer power in 
order to increase the efficiency of EU institutions.  Because most European states continue to see 
their militaries as the last bastion of state sovereignty amidst a changing world, participation is 
not guaranteed.70 Interestingly, the appeal is similar to that given by Jean Monnet in the 
European Coal and Steel Community’s High Authority where he deliberated seventy years ago, 
“If we remain divided as we are, the Europeans will be left exposed to nationalist ambitions and 
will be forced, as happened in the past, to look for outside guarantees in order to protect 
themselves against each other.”71 The underlying evidence from then and now, is that when it 
comes to defense, member states prefer to cooperate case-by-case and not to integrate beyond 
their ability to maintain agency. The European Defense Community set the precedent of 
preferred intergovernmentalism, so much so to the point that in a public letter, eleven former 
generals and admirals counseled EU leaders against the scheme of a supranational army warning, 
“technocrats playing at arm chair generals, building a fictitious paper army, will only serve to 
weaken even further our national capabilities…they should beware: paper tigers burn.”72 A 
supranational model may remove the incoordination of asymmetrical capacities and diverging 
policy interests, and may also be seen as a “coming of age” in the integration process, but it is 
ultimately lacks supports.  
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After announcing Europe’s protection can no longer be outsourced, European 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker stated a year later at the 2018 Munich Security 
Conference that “it cannot be that we always have to decide by unanimity when it comes to 
foreign and defense policies...we would like to emancipate ourselves.”73 These two speeches 
expose that Juncker is talking of two types of emancipation, the European Commission’s 
emancipation from the limits imposed on them by intergovernmentalism, and freedom from 
military dependence on the United States. These desires speak to the two questions that 
underwrite the entirety of the consensus deficit—what model European defense integration 
should adopt and who should be involved in the process? If contemporary declarations by 
European leaders are to be taken at face value, perhaps deeper defense integration and an easing 
on US dependence is on the horizon. But as these treaties demonstrate, disharmony is written in 
the DNA of European defense integration because nations jealously guard their armies as a kind 
of incantation of survival. This could change with more time, or with preconditions that 
incrementally persuade the public towards unification and make it unavoidable for states to 
integrate their armies, as is consistent with Haas’s theory of neofunctionalism. Twenty years later 
in a Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l’Europe interview, Mark Eyskens was asked to reflect 
on his 1991 “worm” reference to which he replied, “as far as military matters go, we are still 
                                               






completely negligible, that’s plain to see.”74 It is clear that defense integration and time do not 
move in the same direction. Yet, must be submitted that there is much to be discovered in the 
unique defense capacity the EU could develop in light of this complex legacy, such as niche 
capacities and knowledge-based security networks. The EU is an intrinsically unique political 
project, it stands to reason it would create something unconventional to compete with the 
circumstances. Still, defense integration may not be able to compete with histories, as Kissinger 
claims, nor is it an inevitable outcome of European cooperation, as Stephanie Anderson suggests, 
but French Foreign Minister Robert Marjolin offers a positive, albeit somewhat resigned, picture 
of post-war reconciliation as an outcome of these early treaties. “Peace reigned in Western 
Europe…Depending on how one looked at human nature, this state of affairs could be seen either 
as a triumph of wisdom over blind violence, or as evidence of utter exhaustion.”75 Yet, wisdom is 
ephemeral and exhaustion unproven to evaporate the preservation of identity. Only by 
vanquishing the spectre of nationalism could the European Union transcend the quixotic legacy 
of these three early treaties and achieve European defense integration.  
  
                                               




75 Marjolin, Robert. “French Officialdom: Main Obstacle in Rome Treaty Negotiations” as quoted by Sherrill Brown 






Anderson, Stephanie. 2008. Crafting the EU Security Policy: In pursuit of European Identity. 
Bolder: Lynne Rienner. 
 
Ardia, Danilo. 1991. "The Byrnes Treaty and the Origins of the Western Alliance, 1946-48." In 
Twentieth-Century Anglo American Relations, by Jonathan Hollowell, 160-161. London: 
Longham. 
 
Baylis, John. 1982. "Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO." The Journal of 
Strategic Studies, June: 247. 
 
Bogdanor, Vernon. 2011. NewStatesman. March 17. Accessed 2018. 
https://www.newstatesman.com/books/2011/03/bismarck-germany-europe-hitler. 
 
Cini, Michelle, and Nieves Perez-Solórzano Borragàn. 2016. European Union Politics. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Commission, European. 2017. Designing Europe's Future: Security and Defense. Special 
Eurobarometer 461, Eurobarometer . 
 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard. 1923. Pan-Europa.  
 
Cross, Mai'a Davis. 2014. Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks Are 
Transforming the European Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
D'Angelo. 2017. "What's Trump's Position on NATO?" May 11. 
https://www.factcheck.org/2016/05/whats-trumps-positions-on-nato/. 
 
Declaration, The Schuman. 1950. May 9. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en. 
 
Dombey, Daniel, and Stanley Pignal. 2007. European see US as threat to peace. July 1. 
https://www.ft.com/content/70046760-27f0-11dc-80da-000b5f10621. 
 
Dwan, R. 2001. "Jean Monnet and the European Defense Community, 1950-1954." Cold War 
History.  
 
Eurobarometer. 2017. "Designing Europe's Future: Security and Defense." Special 
Eurobarameter Report 461. 
 
Eyskins, Mark. 2010. "Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l’Europe." Centre virtuel de la 






Fogarty, Michael P. 1957. "Britain and Europe Since 1945." The Review of Politics, Jan: 90-105. 
 
Forlenza, Rosario. 2017. "The Politics of the Abendland: Christian Democracy and the Idea of 
Europe after the Second World War." Contemporary European History, 261-286. 
 
Gavin, Victor. 2010. "Were the interest really parallel? The United States, Western Europe and 
the Early Integration Project." Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 32-43. 
 
Germond, Basil, Jussi M Hanhimaki, and George-Henri Soutou. 2010. The Routledge Handbook 
of Transatlantic Security. London: Routledge. 
Greenwood, Sean. 1984. "Ernest Bevin, France and 'Western Union': August 1945-February 
1946." European History Quarterly, July: 319. 
—. 1983. "Return to Dunkirk: The Origins of the Anglo-French Treaty of March 1947." The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, December: 52. 
 
Gualle, Charles De. 1964. "Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General 
Charles de Gualle, May 19, 1958-January 31,1961." New York: French Embassy Press 
and Information Bureau. 
 
Haas, Enrst B. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economical Forces, 1950-
1957. London: Stevens. 
 
Habermas, J., and J Derrida. 2003. "What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common 
Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe." Constellations, 291-297. 
 
Hollowell, Jonathan. 2001. Twentieth-century Anglo-American Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Howorth, Jolyon. 2017. "EU-NATO coopertion: the Key to Europe's Security Future." European 
Security, 456. 
 
Insall, Tony, and P Salomon. 2015. "The Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties, 1947-1949." 
Documents on British Policy Overseas.  
 
Jones, Seth. 2010. "The European Union and the Security Dilemma." Securities Studies 119. 
 
Junker, Jean-Claude. 2017. "European Commission." June. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-17-1581_en.htm. 
 
Kissinger, Henry A. 1957. A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration of 
Peace, 1812-1822. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
 





Laughland, John. 1998. The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Ideas. 
London: Warner Books. 
 
Ludlow, Piers. 1999. "Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-1966." Contemporary 
European History 234. 
 
McCormick, John. 2007. The European Superpower. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
—. 2005. Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction. Bakingstroke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Mogherini, Federica. 2017. PESCO. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en. 
 
Monnet, Jean. 1978. Memoirs. New York: Doubleday. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2017. "The Future of Europe: Coping with Crisis ." Great Decisions: 
Foreign Policy Association.  
 
Nelsen, Brent F., and Alexander Stubb. 1994. The European Union: Readings on the Theory and 
Practice of European Integration. Bolder: Lynne Rienner. 
 
Nugent, Neill. 2017. The Government and Politics of the European Union. London: Palgrave 
Macmillion. 
 
Pertinax, By. 1948. "Byrnes Arms Pact Reported Dropped." New York Times, Feb 21. 
 
Posen, Barry. 2006. "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?" 
Security Studies, 149-186. 
 
Reykers, Yf. 2017. "EU Battlegroups: High costs, no benefits." Contemporary Security Policy, 
457-470. 
 
Reynold, D. 1991. Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth 
Cencury. London: Longham. 
 
Salmon, Trevor, and William Nicoll. 1997. Building European Union: A Documentary History 
and Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Satterthwaite, Joseph C. 1972. "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey." The Annals of American 
Academy of Political and Social Science.  
42 
 
Schwartz, Thomas. 1995. The Transnational Partnership: Jean Monnet and Jack McCoy. 
Washington, DC: Jean Monnet Council. 
 
Spinelli, Altiero, and Ernesto Rossi. 1944. "Manifesto di Ventonene: For a Free and United 
Europe." 
 
Stokes, K. Simmons, Jocob Poushter, and Jacob Poushter. 2015. NATO Publics Blames Russia 




Svik, Peter. 2016. "The Czechoslovak Factor in Western Alliance Building, 1945-1948." Journal 
of Cold War Studies, 137. 
 
Treaty, The Dunkirk. 1947. "Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Between His Majesty in Respect of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the President of the 
French Republic." The international Law Quarterly.  
 
Tusk, Donald. n.d. "United we stand, divided we fall: letter by President Donald Tusk to the 27 




Warren, Lansing. 1950. "West Union Speeds Arms Integration: Britain, France, Benelux Meet to 
Merge Defense Plans into North Atlantic Accord." The New York Times.  
 
Wells, Sherrill Brown. 2011. Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
—. 2007. Pioneers of European Integration and Peace, 1945-1963: a Brief History with 
Document. New York: Bedford St. Martin's. 
 
Whitney, Craig. 1991. "https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-
gulf-fighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html." War in the Gulf: Europe; Gulf 
Sighting Shatters Europeans' Fragile Unity.  
 
Yeşilada, Birol, Genna Jacek, Gaspare Osman, and Goktug Tanrikulu. 2018. Global Power 
Transistion and the Future of the European Union. London: New York: Routledge. 
 
Zeeman, Bert. 1986. ""Britain and the Cold War: An Alternative Approach. The Treaty of 
Dunkirk Example." European History Quarterly , 353. 
 
 
 
